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Abstract
The work has established that the teaching of moral virtue (as providing a 
rationale for authoritative appeals to morality) has been woefully lacking in 
African schools today and so there is need to revisit it if children are to be 
moulded into good moral citizens. Through the use of conceptual analysis 
and the questionnaire method, it was observed that authoritative appeals to 
morality alone could not increase the child's moral awareness; neither did it 
improve the child’s moral reasoning structures. About 60 pupils from four 
primary schools in Harare participated in "this study and the results of the 
study showed that authoritative appeals to morality did very little in morally 
conscientising children in primary schools. The study also challenged Aristotle 
who had argued that moral virtues could not be taught as they were informed 
by habit (Ostwald, 1962:33). The work advocated for the position that moral 
virtue cannot be formed by habit alone. Rather; it can be aided by moral 
instruction, as this would provide the underlying rationale or justification 
for authoritatively appealing to moral rules and principles. To this end, the 
paper re-examined some of the moral rules and principles (as sources of 
morality) with a view to establishing whether through appealing to such rules 
and principles, moral virtue can be successfully cultivated in our citizens. 
These two sources were divided into authoritative and rational appeals to 
rules and principles in citizenship education.
Introduction
There has been a tendency to confuse authoritative precepts to morality or 
to reduce morality to mere conventions. Even inThe Republic, Socrates is 
grappling with this problem where he is trying to convince the sophists that 
justice, as a moral concept, cannot be reduced to mere conventions, but is 
an inner state of the soul with each of its parts being able to fulfil its own 
function under the rule of reason which enlists the aid of the spirited part
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(the feelings) in controlling the appetites (Crube, 1974: 86). This work will 
not howevei; concentrate on arguments and refutations in The Republic , but 
it will show that although authoritative appeals to rules and principles can 
be very important to non-moral agents such as infants or kindergartens, in 
the first stage of Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, such 
authoritative appeals need not be taken as the final source of moral virtue, 
the end in view of moral instruction. Inasmuch as children will always be 
required to obey authority, they also need the underlying rationale behind 
such authoritative pronouncements, be it defacto or c/e/ureThis work gives a 
catalogue of authoritative appeals to rules and principles and tries to explain 
how and why such appeals fall short of being called moral precepts. The 
work, therefore, seeks to show that reason and reason alone should define 
morality. Children need to know why certain rules should be obeyed or why 
certain actions should be avoided. This is the same project that Aristotle is 
undertaking in The Nicomachean Ethics to show that moral virtue should be 
informed by reason aided by habit. T h e  only difference is that for Aristotle, 
moral virtue cannot be taught vyhiie the position of this paper is that moral 
teaching can complete the process.. The project of teaching in schools can 
only proceed if the concept of virtue is re-emphasised. This may sound.like a 
direct challenge to Aristotle who believes that moral virtue cannot be taught, 
but the point .is that since it is possible to initiate children into certain 
authoritative rules and principles, all that instructors or teachers need to do 
is to explain to children reasons why we should respect certain rules or 
conventions.
Instrumentation and Procedure
In this research, conceptual analysis was used as a research instrument to 
establish whether through appealing-to authority alone, pupils can be 
introduced to moral reasoning structures and learn to be good citizens, it 
was established, during the course of this study, that children accepted certain 
rules in class without being rationally conscious of their implications to their 
daily lives. O f the 60 pupils who were studied at four primary schools in 
Harare, 54 (90% ) showed that they avoided being late to school for fear of 
punishment by their teachers. They also wanted to do well in class because 
of certain rewards that came with such performances. It is, therefore, clear 
from this study that pupils were motivated more by extrinsic rewards to do 
well in class than by the fact that doing well was something good in itself. 
The research involved one infant class (grade 2) and one junior class (grade 
5) but the results obtained were almost the same. The pupiis and teachers
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were informed about the purpose of the study. They were assured that the 
data they were to provide were for academic purposes only and that the 
research was being done in strict confidence.
Research Methodology
The study was meant to establish whether by appealing to authority alone, 
children can be taught to be good citizens. Since this is a study in the area of 
Philosophy, the method of conceptual analysis was used although the  
questionnaire method was constantly referred to. This method was used to 
fetch answers from 60 pupils at four Primary Schools in Harare. The random 
sampling method was used to select the classes: namely grades 2  and 5. The  
only problem encountered through the use of this questionnaire method 
was that some teachers could not return the questionnaires on time and 
others decided not to return them at all, making it very difficult to come up 
with accurate, information regarding the study. However, for those  
questionnaires which were returned,, the responses were quite clear and 
precise. We will now delve into the core issues of the study by, first, briefly, 
defining citizenship education so as to position our argument.
Citizenship Education: A brief definition
One cannot define citizenship education before defining the concept of a 
citizen, the concept of education and the concept of morality. A citizen, 
according to E.M Kirkpatrick (1983-230), is a member of a state, a freeman/ 
woman or a civilian. Citizenship is, therefore, the state of being or of having 
rights and duties as a citizen. R.S Peters (1959: 85) defines education as a 
discipline that relates to some sort of processes in which a desirable state of 
mind develops. Education, for Peters, is a value-laden concept, that is, it is a 
moral concept, lo  be educated is to be moral. Morality relates to those social 
rules or principles that guide and regulate human behaviour. In this article, 
citizenship education shall be defined as instruction in morality or moral 
virtue.
Authoritative appeals to rules and principles in citizenship 
education
It is important to note that many people today identify and equate moral 
principles with particular rules and these rules may often (though not always) 
depend on authoritative pronouncements of parents, teachers, or religious
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institutions such as churches as sources of justification. To be moral, then, 
on this interpretation is simply to live in accordance with certain rules that 
are validated by appeals to authority, “that is what my father told me or that 
is what the Bible says” (Straughan, 1982: 54). This is not, of course, the only 
kind of justification that could be offered for such rules. One might appeal to 
other ‘non-authoritative’ considerations such as personal satisfaction, social 
cohesion, the preservation of family unit or the prevention of a sexually 
transmitted infection. Nor should it be assumed that only sexual rules might 
be identified with morality in this way..
Straughan (1982: 55) maintains: “because the main point of issuing 
authoritative pronouncements is to rule out the possibility of independent 
judgement, attempts to define the ‘moral content’ this way are bound to be 
futile." Nothing can become morally right because someone says that it is so, 
and that obedience to an authority is, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the 
business of moral decision-making. Rather, some degree of free choice and 
independent judgements seems to be a necessary part of what it means to 
be a moral agent (Peters, 1981:252), Given that authoritative pronouncements 
may be based on mistaken assumptions or wrong premises, it would be absurd 
for one to hold on to such appeals as, I love CAPS United Football Club or 
Dynamos Football Club, without having a rational basis for that. Authoritative 
pronouncements can only be used as sources of justification if they are 
accompanied by a rationale. Against this background, Straughan (1982: 26) 
quotes Kurt Baier who says,
If I hold that it is wrong to drink or smoke because my father says so, 
arid if it really is the fact alone that he does say so to which I am. 
appealing, then my belief is of an arbitrary kind, which cannot count 
as a moral judgement. But if l.hold that it is wrong to drink or smoke 
because my father has pointed and explained to me the dangers and 
problems which these activities may create...then my belief does not 
rest upon the mere fact of his making a'pronouncement, but upon . 
other considerations to which he has drawn my attention and which 
I have independently evaluated myself. .
As Baier maintains, a person may value the moral advice and guidance of 
some people on the basis of them directing his attention to the moral aspects 
of situations in a way which the person may find illuminating (Ibid, 1982:62). 
Clearly, extreme versions of this view which rely solely on the fact that such- 
and-such ah authority exists and pronounces will result in rigid codes of
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conduct being laid down for children to follow unquestioningly, often 
reinforced by punishments to be inflicted for breaches of the authority’s rules 
though whether such a process can properly be allowed the title of moral 
education is questionable. Immanuel Kant, who argues that morality cannot 
be hypothetical but rather categorical, heavily challenges this. Hypothetical 
imperatives for Kant, set conditions for actions, for example, if you want to 
get the job, then you should pass the interview. Morality cannot be understood 
this way but in the categorical sense, which stipulates reasons for actions. 
For instance, “murder is bad because it is motivated by bad intentions" (Guyer, 
1998:81).
However, the highest moral accolade will probably be reserved for respect of 
authority itself as a general rule or principle, because it is only through 
adherence to that precept that such a system can be maintained: “Conversely, 
critical questions will be treated as educational and moral vices rather than 
virtues, as they may pose a threat to the status and reputation of the authority 
in question" (Straughan, 1982:57).
The description of the source of moral virtue sounds proper, yet there must 
be a few teachers or parents who can deny ever having responded to a child’s 
“why...?” With that most economical of answers, “Because I say so!” and 
indeed is this answer always to be deplored? Elaborate, reasoned explanation 
and justification is inappropriate in the hurly-burly of a classroom or play 
ground of family riot, and an emphatic reference to the teacher’s or parent’s 
role as an authority on such occasions may be the most effective (or the only) 
way of supporting a moral directive. Yet, although this kind of procedure 
may occasionally be justifiable, Straughan (1982: 57) argues that,
The fact remains that a system of control, which tries to transmit a 
particular code of conduct to children, simply by pointing to the fact 
that the code is prescribed by some authority, canpot claim to be 
doing anything that can be called either moral or educational.
Getting children to be obedient, for Straughan, is not teaching them to be 
good. The learning of conventional rules and principles is problematic in 
that “...young children do, as a matter of fact, see the dictates of authority 
as a sufficient and valid form of moral justification” (Straughan, 1982: 58). 
For Straughan, appeals to authority may, however, be unavoidable when 
dealing with young children.. .it would be surprising or paradoxical to discover
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that children have to pass through certain non-moral stages of thinking before 
they can get to grips with morality proper, if we wish children to come to 
exercise their moral judgement at some stage, it would seem that to offer, 
simple reasoned justifications for rules even to young children can at worst 
do no harm, and may at best encourage the gradual development of more 
rational thinking (Straughan, 1982: 58).
As Peters postulates, “teaching implies the exercise of various forms of 
authority. So teaching children to be good citizens can hardly be a totally 
non-authoritative business even though morality can never be defined in 
terms of mere obedience to authority” (Nibblet, 1963: 18). Authoritative 
appeals to moral rules and principles remain the starting point of moral 
education, not its end in view. But if authoritative appeals cannot supply the 
subject matter of moral rules and principles, what.other sources can we look 
to? Many philosophers have held that morality is essentially a rational matter 
and that reasoned justification forms its central core. Peters has, in this regard, 
come up with what can be referred to as rational appeals to rules and principles 
in morality and moral education. For Peters, all authoritative pronouncements 
should have the underlying rationale.
Rational appeals to rules and principles in citizenship education
Peters begins with what he calls the activity of “practical discourse” or 
“practical reason”: “the situation postulated is one in which any individual, 
possessed of public language, asks the question, ‘what ought I to do?’ ” 
There are alternatives open to him and he is asking for reasons for adopting 
one alternative rather than another (Peters, 1966:121). Ifa  person is seriously 
discussing with others or with himself what he ought to do, Peters maintains 
that he is thereby accepting the importance of seeking reasons for action 
and is also acknowledging implicitly the validity of certain moral principles 
(Ibid, 1966: 121). For instance, the principle of fairness or justice can be 
established in this way, because by searching for reasons why one should 
treat somebody in one way rather than another, one is tacitly granting that 
different forms of treatment are justified only if different situational factors 
exist. In other words, “fairness means treating people in the same way unless 
there are relevant differences between them and looking for these relevant 
differences is an integral part of considering seriously what one ought to do” 
(Straughan, 1982: 74).
Peters ajso deduces the principles of truth telling, freedom, consideration o f 
others’ interests and respect for persons. Truth telling, for Peters, becomes a 
necessary moral principle, because for a person seriously to ask: “what ought 
I to do?” presupposes that.he is concerned to purse and discover the truth. 
Freedom entails non- interference when doing what one perceives as good, 
that is, consideration of others’ interests. Respect for persons entails 
committing oneself to listening to what other people have to say about the 
matter and respecting their view points ( Ibid. 1966:75). This is exactly what 
Kant’s second maxim says about respect for persons, “act so as to treat 
humanity always as ends and never merely as means to your own ends” 
(Raphael, 1981:56).
So Peters seems to be taking a cue of this Kantian maxim as stipulated in the 
categorical imperative. The argument here seems to be that human beings 
have a rational capacity and this differentiates them from lower animals like 
dogs, donkeys and monkeys that are not bestowed with this capacity. As a 
result, they (human beings) deserve respect. Expecting people to respect 
authority unquestioningly, without providing.a rational basis is tantamount 
to treating them merely as a means to one’s own ends. From a Kantian 
perspective moral virtue cannot proceed this way. For Peters, as quoted in 
Straughan (1982: 75),
These principles do not provide straightforward answers to questions 
about what one ought to do in any particular situation. To implement 
- the principle of fairness, for example, one would have to decide what 
counts as a ‘relevant difference’ between two people, which might 
justify treating them differently. The principle alone will not tell a 
teacher, for instance, how to treat children of different abilities, 
backgrounds, ages and sex within the same moral area. Telling the 
truth may not always be thought compatible with considering others’ 
interests.
These “practical problems", as Straughan (1982: 76) likes to cal! them, 
however; do not pose any real threat to Peters’ position, for he is not claiming 
to provide a moral instruction manual with answers tailor-made for all 
contingencies, but rather a general framework of guiding principles which 
all moral deliberation must take into account. The main difficulty about Peters’ 
argument is that one must participate in the moral field or area, or in 
Straughan’s terms, one must be a moral agent before its force can be felt. As 
Straughan (1982: 76) postulates:
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Once I am in the (moral) position of “seriously” asking questions about 
' what I morally ought to do, then I may well be implicitly accepting 
that there are necessary, moral principles of the kind which Peters 
describes, but have to be playing the moral game before I can see the 
point of its rules.
Peters seems to be saying that before accepting any ruies there is need to 
seriously reflect on them, to puzzle through rather than to simply accept 
them because they come from a respectable authority. The power of reason 
should dictate whether these moral rules would have a binding force to us or 
not.
According to Dearden (1998:173), “this clearly imposes on the scope of Peters' 
theory, but the fact remains that the vast majority of people do qualify as 
moral agents, in the sense that they sometimes ask moral questions and 
make moral decisions they are often unclear as to what sort of reasons count 
as morally relevant in deciding what they ought to do. In this situation, Peters’ 
account is particularly handy as it draws the attention of the moral agent to 
the hidden implications of asking moral questions; by describing a specific 
set of moral principles to which he must already be committed, perhaps 
unknowingly.”
Peters dwells significantly on the business of moral education. This account 
of morality suggests some particular problems likely to be encountered in 
teaching children to be good citizens. Straughan maintains that Peters' theory 
presupposes a moral agent asking ‘serious’ moral questions and following 
the rule of the moral game, but Straughan asks: How do children learn to 
piay this game? (Peters, 19 74: 253). Morality, according to Peters, is based 
on principles though not in a rigid or unreasoning way. He says:
My concern is for the development of an autonomous type of character 
who follows rules in a rational and discriminating manner, that is, a 
person must be able to use rationality to follow certain rules at the 
expense of others. He must not only come to know what is, in general, 
right or wrong; he must also go beyond the level of what Plato called 
the "doxa, that is correct opinion,” so that he sees why such rules are 
right and wrong and can revise rules and make new ones in the light 
of new knowledge and new circumstances (Peters, 1974:253).
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But how can children be encouraged to develop towards this level? This is 
the paradox of moral education. For the major difficulty here is that young 
children are far from being rational or autonomous characters able to 
appreciate that reasons can justify rules and that rules can be in partially 
evaluated and revised as was observed during the course of this study. As 
Peters argue, “the brute facts of child developrhent reveal that at the most 
formaitiveyears of a child’s development, he is incapable of this form of life 
and impervious to the proper manner of passing it on” ( Ibid: 271). It is for 
this reason that Peters sees habit formation as playing an essential part in 
the moral development of young children; “they can or must enter the palace 
of reason through the courtyard of habit and tradition” (Peters, 1974; 272). 
Peters seems to be borrowing this idea from Aristotle. In book 2 of The 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle argues that, there are two categories of virtue, 
namely, intellectual virtue and moral virtue. Peters further remarks,
Intellectual virtue, for Aristotle, owes its origin and development 
chiefly to teaching and for that reason requires experience and time.
Moral virtue, on the other hand, is formed by habit, ethos and its 
name ethike is therefore derived by a slight variation, from ethos.
This shows too that none of the moral virtues is implanted in us by : 
nature, for nothing which exists by . nature can be changed by habit 
(Ostwald, 1962:33)! .
Thus, the virtues are implanted in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature. 
We are, by nature, equipped with the ability to receive them and habit brings 
this ability to completion arid fulfilment {Ibid, 1962:33). Aristotle, here, seems 
to be suggesting that'moral virtues cannot be imparted to children by means 
of formal instruction, but he is somehow silent as to how habit and habit 
alone can form these Virtues. The thesis defended in this work is that whije it 
may be difficult, or rathei; impossible for moral virtue to be taught'(as Aristotle 
reasoned), moral, instruction can enhance habit in the candour of rrioral 
formation.. Jt is this teaching or moral instruction which will provide the 
underlying rationale as to why some, actions are good while others are bad. 
Moral instruction will help children to run away from dogmatic authoritative. 
appealsto moral rules and principles and appreciate the meaning and value 
of such rules and/or principles.
It is my humble submission, in this paper, that habit and habit alone cannot 
provide justification for moral decision-making. It has to be aided by some 
form of moral instruction or teaching. The argument that Aristotle is
presenting is deductive and.is more applicable tp the Occident than to' the 
African context. In the Shona society; when children inquire about biological 
issueslike, Mhamha mwana mamuwana kupi ? (Mum, where did. you get.the 
baby?), the children are often told all sorts of stories like ndamutenga 
kuchipatara (I bought him or her at the hospital). All this is meant to hide 
information, which is considered taboo to persons who have not yet matured 
and cannot, build moral concepts atthat age.. But when asked to justify her 
position by the child, the mother would simply say, “Babies are bought." This . 
makes sense to the child.at that age. It is during the adolescence stage that 
the.child will discover the real truth.
The argument remains that, there is a level at which children need to be 
taught values and virtues Without hitting the target. This should not be ‘ 
interpreted to mean that children could not attain moral virtue through 
teaching. Ail the superstitions in the Shona and Ndebele culture serve as 
teaching methods in the area of morality and etiquette and as justification 
can be easily provided for them; Ukagara muhzira unoita mamota (if you sit on 
the road, you will develop boils). This proposition should hot be taken literally 
to mean that sitting on the road is catastrophic to health-, but is meant to 
safeguard children against common read accidents. The expression is hidden 
but much stronger than simply telling children not to sit on the road because 
of the prospect of accidents.
For Louis Alvin. Day (2003: 6), the question of whether morality or moral . 
^virtues can be taught is difficult and controversial, it must, however, be. 
confronted directly. For Day, there.are two schools of thought on this matter. 
Cynics contend that ethics is not a proper subject for study at all because it i 
raises questions without providing.clear answers {Ibid> 2003:6). Besides, the . 
sceptics argue, knowledge of ethical principles and norms does not necessarily. 
produce a morai person. On the contrary, when confronted with real ethical . 
dilemmas, people will ignore whatever wisdom was dispensed in an ethiiCs 
course and act in their own self-interest; And in ajl candors, there is some 
credible evidence, spanning the last fifty years that character education cjasses 
and conventional religious instruction programmes apparently have no 
significant influence on moral conduct. Sceptics also argue that children’s 
moral development is completed before they reach school and thus, that 
such character education classes can have little effect ( Ibid, 2003: 6).
This view assumes, of course, that moral maturity...unlike physical maturity . 
ends at a very early age, a dubious proposition at best (Day 2003:7). Indeed,
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we are a work in progress, ethically speaking. Age is no barrier to the. 
cultivation of moral virtue or the accumulation of moral wisdom. Day seems 
to be making a very crucial point here, which is in line with the position 
taken by.this work, that children are capable of assimilating moral values 
through teaching or moral instruction as they have the potency by virtue of 
being human beings. " "
This project starts at informal (family) level where parents use folklores and1 
superstitions to impart moral knowledge to their children. The project is 
then taken, over by schools where the teaching becomes formalised. The 
other school of thought represented by optimistic proponents of formal ethics 
training holds that ethics is a subject like Maths, Physics or History with its 
own set of problems and distinctive methods of solving them. In this view
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Thus, the study of ethics is the key to understanding moral conduct and to 
improving the human spiritual condition. Surely, the optimists contend, this . 
objective is worth of attention in academic curricula. Socrates reflects this 
view when he remarks rather bluntly in Plato’s Apology that, “the unexamined 
life is not worth living:" However, even Socrates, apparently doubted at one 
time that morality was teachable, but the urgent public criticism of the ethical.. 
standards of the professions, in general compels us to accept the optimistic 
view of ethics instruction. This also vindicates Peters’ position that children 
must be taught a set of “basic rules” which they come to adopt as habits in as 
rational a manner as is possible for them at that time, until they are able to 
think more critically about how such rules must be justified.
However, Peters raises a fundamental question: “But how are we to decide 
what these “basic rules” are to be? (Peters, 1974: 272). Again we are faced 
with the problem of defining the subject matter of morality. Peters sees no 
difficulty here. He argues that there is. considerable agreement between 
“reflective pieople” about what the basic rules are, those concerning contracts, 
property, the care of the young and the avoidance of pain and injury. Indeed, 
Peters takes a utilitarian stance here. These rules, in Peters’view, are necessary 
for. any tolerable form of social life and are closely connected with the more 
general moral principles ajready mentioned (Straughan, 1982:78).
There is probably more room for disagreement here than Peters ajlows over 
which ‘ basic rules” children should be taught, this list of rules is a short one,
which could hardly constitute an adequate moral code for young children 
yet even this limited set of rules, may not be accepted by all reflective people 
as being unquestioningly moral. Bring together a group of parents which 
includes some Marxists, child-centred atheists, some squatters, some gypsies 
and some fundamentalist Christians all of whom would, of course, claim to' 
be reflective people, and you are not likely to find much agreement over: 
particular rules about property, contracts and the care of the young, even if 
they all accept the general principles which Peters enumerates. Straughan 
raises this question, “so are we to decide upon a commonly agreed set; of 
moral rules to which children should become habituated in the .early stages 
of their moral developm ent?"/^ 1982: 78).
Despite.these difficulties, which tend to confront any study of morality and 
moral education, Peters' work in this area is extremely useful, in particular, 
the way in which he tries to reconcile his account of morality with the facts 
of child development produces a realistic picture of how moral education, 
might proceed, it illustrates well, how philosophical questions have to be 
asked about the nature of morality itself before one can decide whether or 
not one can teach children to be good citizens or whether it is possible to 
instruct children in moral virtue:
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Conclusion.
The work looked at morality and moral virtue with a view to showing how 
and to what extent authority can be used as a source of morality and/or 
moral rules and principles in the moral development of the African child. An 
attempt was made to show that authority could only provide the raw materials 
and reason could complete such efforts, for authority without justification in 
the cognitive moral development of the child is bound to be futile. The work 
also looked at the place of moral instruction or teaching as the window 
through which moral virtues could be attained. For all intents and purposes, 
Aristotle, the Cynics and the Sceptics had defended the thesis that moral 
virtue could not be taught as it was attained through the courtyard of habit. 
In the final analysis, the paper challenged this Aristotelian position by 
maintaining that habit alone was not enough to justify the existence of moral 
rules and principles, hence, the need to place emphasis on moral instruction 
or teaching both at informal (family) and at formal (school) level.
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